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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on the approach to population projections that has been labeled scenario 
analysis. It looks at the original meaning of "scenario" and then discusses its appropriate usage 
in population projections with respect to several criteria, especially that of consistency of 
assumptions. 
Next, the paper describes the practical considerations and actual experiences in an IIASA effort 
to define alternative scenarios for 12 world regions to the year 2030 through discussions of a 
group of experts. Because of differential expertise and an uneasiness of experts to numerically 
define alternative scenarios, an interactive group process was chosen rather than a larger Delphi. 
On practical and theoretical grounds it became apparent that individual responsibility and 
judgement of the authors cannot be replaced by an anonymous "objective" entity making the 
assumptions. 
Finally, the paper discusses what kind of alternative variants (or scenarios) the users can handle 
and do expect. It is exemplified through the specific question whether the UN should change its 
current practice of making population projections. Pro and contra arguments are listed 
concerning the proposal to include alternative mortality assumptions into the three main variants 
that are widely publicized. 
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1. Introduction 
As the pace of developments in our modern world increases, appropriate planning for the future 
becomes an ever more important element of success at all levels ranging from government 
policies to corporate strategies and private life-time planning. Changes in population size, 
structure and distribution generally are not the most important elements of planning, but they 
do make a difference for many issues. Furthermore, population patterns tend to change more 
slowly than other relevant factors (such as economic ones) and therefore can provide an element 
of stability in planning. Hence, there is a clear demand for some kind of population projections 
on global, national and even subnational levels. The users of such projections range from 
government agencies concerned with planning in education, social security and labor force, to 
members of the non-demographic, scientific community who need population figures as input to 
their own models (e.g. of energy demand) and private corporations concerned with future 
markets and labor supply. 
For demographers, forecasting is one of their oldest activities, but yet--as Keyfitz (1994) recently 
stated--"it has never been fully integrated with the main body of demographic theory and data. 
The fact that the public regards it as our most important task, finds no reflection in our research 
agenda" (p. xii). A broad and comprehensive discussion about fundamental issues involved in 
population projections is clearly necessary and should include the users of population projections. 
Particular emphasis needs to be given to the questions of the output parameters desired, of the 
time horizon demanded, and of the way in which the users expect to see the issue of uncertainty 
treated. Whether they want to be presented with just one most likely prediction, or a full 
probability distribution of alternative futures, or anything in between these two extremes, is an 
important question which is rarely addressed explicitly. Usually, the people who produce the 
projections define the task themselves. This broad discussion will be attempted elsewhere1 and 
will not be the focus of this paper, which will look explicitly at the issue of "scenarios" in 
population projection. Not to forget about the user's perspective, however, is a thought that will 
follow us throughout this paper. 
Since by all that we know it is clear that a primary concern for all kinds of users is information 
about the most likely course of future population trends, possibly together with certain 
alternatives, in this paper we will only discuss point estimates of future trends rather than full 
probability distributions. In Section 2 we will discuss the usage of the notion of "scenarios" and 
its specific meaning in the context of population projections, followed in Section 3 by some 
practical experiences in defining alternative assumptions based on expert opinions. In Section 
4, finally, we will discuss what are the priorities from a user's perspective, especially with respect 
to the question of how much emphasis should be given to alternative mortality trends as 
compared to fertility and even migration. 
' An international meeting on the broad issue of basic approaches to international population projections 
is planned to be held at IIASA in January 1996 as a component of IIASA's new International Population 
Projection Workshop (IPPW). This meeting will also include various groups of users. 
Only in recent years the notion of scenarios has been introduced into the population projections 
terminology. EUROSTAT, IIASA, the Council of Europe and some statistical agencies and 
authors (e.g. Ahlberg and Vaupel 1990) now choose to call the alternative calculations 
"scenarios." It is not always clear whether those authors and institutions that now prefer to use 
the word "scenario" instead of "variant" also consider this a change in the basic approach to 
population projection, or whether it merely reflects a change in terminology without a change 
in the meaning. 
Although the word "scenario" was occasionally used in the context of population at an earlier 
point in time, a library search among the English-language literature for titles of independent 
publications that include the word "scenario" and deal with population projections lists as the first 
title an IIASA study of the late 1980s. It is indicative of the process of spreading the usage of 
this notion that this particular title ("Population Futures for Europe: An Analysis of Alternative 
Scenarios," by Wolf et al., 1988), including the word "scenario," had not been chosen by the 
demographers, but had been assigned to IIASA's Population Program by the organizers of an 
IIASA meeting on the impact of new technologies on the European environment. By that time 
the word "scenario" had obviously become a standard notion in the analysis of environmental 
change, and more generally in systems analysis. 
But what exactly does "scenario" mean in the context of population projections? In the following 
section we will try to elaborate a bit on this question in order to avoid confusion in the rest of 
the paper and elsewhere. 
2. Definition and Common Usage of "Scenario" 
The word "scenario" clearly originates from the world of theater. The Oxford English Dictionary 
(in its 1970 edition) defines "scenario" as "A sketch or outline of the plot of a play, giving 
particulars of the scenes, situations, etc." In the 1982 supplement to the Oxford Dictionary, 
additional usages are listed: First, a cinematographic analogy to the usage in theater is given, 
followed by a much more general meaning: "A sketch, outline, or description of an imagined 
situation or sequence of events." But in a short note the editor mentions that the over-use of this 
word in various loose senses has attracted frequent hostile comment. 
Historically the first use of the word "scenario" outside the realm of theater and movies was by 
Herman Kahn in his 1962 book, ThinkingAbout the Unthinkable, in which he painted the picture 
of the consequences of a hypothetical nuclear war, most notably the possibility of a nuclear 
winter. He  used the notion of a scenario in the sense of an unlikely but possible and consistent 
set of events, such as that of an accidental nuclear war. On page 143 Kahn states as part of a 
chapter entitled "Some strange aids to thought": "A scenario results from an attempt to 
describe ... some hypothetical sequence of events...". 
Gradually, the word "scenario" spread into common usage especially in the context of computer 
models for the future. In 1971 the Observer (June 1, p. 27) wrote: "Several of the computer 
'scenarios' include a catastrophic and sudden collapse of population" (113). In 1976 the Scientific 
Ai?zerican (October, p. 79a), in an article by Strong and Klebesadel, comments: "Many of the 
models we have mentioned here are better characterized by the term scenario ... There is so little 
detailed information that the proposals should not be dignified by the term model. Nevertheless 
a good scenario can sometimes lead to a good model" (A/2). 
This last quote indicates that in the natural sciences the notion "scenario" has developed its own 
meaning by characterizing something more vaguely-defined than a quantitative model and often 
expressed in narrative form. In this sense the 1987 System. and Control Encyclopedia states: "A 
scenario is a narrative account of possible states of affairs, typically as these evolve over time. 
Scenario contents are typically based on expert knowledge ... Many scenarios are written in 
relation to the exploration of the future ... Narrative scenario descriptions are particularly useful 
in situations where the future is highly uncertain" (pp. 4152-4153). By putting emphasis on the 
narrative and non-quantitative nature of scenarios, this is clearly a different use of the notion 
from the social and political sciences, where scenarios tend to be associated with quantitative 
computer models of the future. 
What is the appropriate usage of the term "scenario" in the context of population projections? 
Should it reflect the natural or the social science meaning? In the usage of the term in 
demography, so far it has clearly been with respect to alternative quantitative assumptions on 
future fertility, mortality, and migration levels (Ahlberg and Vaupel 1990; Lutz 1991, 1994; 
EUROSTAT 1991; Cliquet 1993). But there seem to be different views as to whether scenarios 
should describe a specific situation (or futuristic vision) at some point in the future--see the 
definition in dberg and Springfeldt (1991) which seems to reflect the usage in population 
geography and policy planning--or whether it should define the path between now and a specific 
point in the future (which is necessary for any quantitative projection). The above definition of 
the Oxford English Dictionary seems to give both views a legitimate place in referring to "an 
imagined situation or sequence of events." 
Another common feature of most writings in the field of population is that scenarios are 
considered as something that clearly needs to be possible but not necessarily likely. To 
distinguish scenarios from variants of population projection, Lutz et al. (1993) made an attempt 
to define scenarios by four criteria: (1) more emphasis is put on the if-then nature of the 
calculation as opposed to a likely prediction; (2) a scenario approach is expected to make all 
assumptions very explicit; (3) all three components of change should be addressed separately; 
and (4) the scenario approach typically looks at a somewhat larger number of scenarios (i.e. 
more than two or three). 
In IIASA's new world population scenarios (Lutz 1994), the two chapters that give "The IIASA 
World Population Scenarios to 2030" (Chapter 15) and "Special World Population Scenarios to 
2100" (Chapter 16) both adhere to the above given criteria, but still have a somewhat different 
underlying philosophy. In Chapter 15, the scenario assumptions are independently defined for 
all three components with alternative projections based on systematic combination (permutation) 
of these assumptions. The three components are treated as being independent. For the long-term 
scenarios given in Chapter 16, alternative assumptions are seen as referring to alternative future 
developments of the underlying socio-economic macro-system (rapid versus slow demographic 
transition). Hence, fertility and mortality are no longer seen as independent, and consistency of 
assumptions becomes an additional criterion. While the first approach (systematic combinations) 
is clearly legitimate and very useful, especially in the context of sensitivity analysis (see Stoto 
1988), the second probably comes closer to the original meaning of "scenario" in the sense of an 
imagined sequence of events that form a consistent "scene." In the first view, scenarios are an 
intermediate step towards a probabilistic modeling of future population; under the second view, 
scenarios serve the more exploratory and educational purpose of thinking alternative futures. 
Both purposes are important; but authors should make clear what they have in mind when they 
use the word "scenario." 
In the current thinking of the author on this issue, the consistency criterium is essential. 
Scenarios must make sense, and it is therefore not legitimate to combine assumptions that 
contradict each other into one scenario. This would clearly not produce a "possible sequence of 
events" or  a "scene." On  the other hand, scenarios may and should describe unlikely sequences 
of events which, in the case of population projections, does not only include unlikely levels of 
fertility, mortality and migration, but also unlikely combinations of the three components. For  
this reason, the consistency criterium only excludes strict inconsistencies but not unlikely 
combinations. 
For  practical choices of what assumptions to combine in a scenario, the visions of alternative 
megatrends (i.e. socio-economic trends that impact on fertility, mortality and migration) in the 
future of both the users and the producers of the projections should provide guidance. This is 
more important for long-term projections than in the shorter run where the  three components 
may be rather independent. For developing countries, there could be  a vision of "rapid 
modernization" (implying rapid educational improvements for women combined with rapid 
mortality and fertility declines) as  opposed to "slow modernization." For  the United Nations 
system, the Cairo Programme of Action provided the important vision of mutually reinforcing 
improvements in health services, female empowerment, and access to quality family planning. 
Hence, for the U N  population projections, the presentation of a scenario combining lower 
fertility with lower mortality would make more sense in the context of the Cairo vision than its 
current practice (as will be  discussed in Section 4 below). In this context, it needs to be  
questioned whether the two "scenarios" (they a re  actually called scenarios) presented by 
EUROSTAT (combining high fertility with low mortality in one scenario, and low fertility with 
high mortality in another one, and not giving the user any most likely case) are  really a wise 
choice. 
3. Practical Experiences in Translating Expert Knowledge into Global 
Population Scenarios 
The following describes a case study of one attempt at  defining a set of global population 
scenarios by a group of experts. The goal of the exercise was to  produce a new set of alternative 
population projections that avoid some of the shortcomings of the United Nations and World 
Bank projections. The two most significant things to be  done differently were (a) to  give much 
more room to substantive elaborations behind the specific assumptions chosen (and 80% of the 
resulting book (Lutz 1994) was devoted to this), and (b) to give more attention to  possible 
alternative trends in mortality and migration as opposed to the traditional focus on fertility. A s  
mentioned above, the book gives two quite different sets of projections to 2030 and to 2100. The  
following notes will only refer to the first set of projections, because the invited experts refused 
to consider assumptions beyond the year 2030. Consequently, the assumptions of the long-term 
projections were entirely defined by the group of authors of the projections (Lutz et  al. 1994). 
In general, there seem to  be  three strategies for specifying all the necessary assumptions on 
alternative future fertility, mortality, and migration levels: (1) Specify some time series models 
for past trends that, when continued into the future under different assumptions, would provide 
the necessary parameter values; (2) select our own assumptions based on our informed 
judgement after reading all the commissioned background papers and other relevant literature; 
and (3) define the assumptions in a Delphi-like effort in a workshop of experts. 
Possibility (1) seemed to be too mechanistic, leaving out some of the important expert knowledge 
(such as  information on reproductive preferences or  advances in medicine) that is not reflected 
in past time series data. Possibility (2) had been practiced in IIASA's 1991 book on Europe and 
North America (Lutz 1991) and was clearly a fallback strategy in case of no better choice. 
Possibility (3) was the most challenging to us and seemed to be most appropriate in synthesizing 
the expertise of a group of specialists. Consequently, a group of 12 experts and authors of 
background papers was convened at IIASA for three days in December 1992. 
The typical approach for collecting the views of a number of experts about future trends is the 
so-called Delphi technique. The most common form of the Delphi is the paper-and-pencil 
version, which is also referred to as a "Delphi Exercise" (see Linstone and Turoff 1975). In this 
situation, a small monitor team designs a questionnaire which is sent to a larger respondent 
group. After the questionnaire is returned, the monitor team summarizes the results. Sometimes 
the respondent group is given an opportunity to reevaluate its original answers, based upon 
examination of the group response. This typical Delphi approach does not provide for any 
further interaction or discussion among the group participants. Because of this we did not choose 
a typical Delphi for the following three reasons: 
(1) Differential expertise: We needed many specific assumptions, such as fertility and mortality 
levels in specific world regions. But only very few experts exist who could reasonably evaluate 
the specific component at the given level of aggregation (i.e. transcending the national level and 
yet have specific knowledge about the individual 12 world regions chosen). How should the 
answers of different people be weighted with respect to their degree of expertise on the issue? 
(2) There is a real possibility that most experts are biased in the same direction. A good 
cautionary example is given by the ongoing survey of projections on the likely future price of oil 
by the International Energy Workshop (see Manne and Schrattenholzer 1995). Figure 1 shows 
the projections as assessed by a large group of the world's leading energy experts and relates it 
to the actual oil price at the time of the assessment. It is stunning to see how the average 
assessment of this expert group always extrapolates the most recent trend. Only in the years 
immediately following the rapid decline in oil prices, conventional thinking about increasing 
prices seems to have been stronger than the influence of the decline, which obviously was 
considered a short-term perturbation of the long-term trend. More than ten years after the 
decline, however, the view that oil prices tend to be stable at a low level seems to dominate the 
picture. It is remarkable that the average assessment of this significant group of experts declined 
by a factor of more than four within only one decade. Unfortunately, we have no information 
about the ex ante uncertainty attached to these estimates, because the International Energy 
Workshop only asked about one most likely value. 
There are many less extreme examples for changing assumptions in the field of population 
projections, especially concerning fertility assumptions before and after the baby boom. But also 
in the fields of mortality, the UN assumptions about the maximum life expectancy considered 
(see Bucht 1994)--which result from extensive interagency consultations--needed to be increased 
by ten years of life expectancy within only 15 years (1973 to 1988) because observed life 
expectancies in the most advanced countries were likely to surpass the assumed absolute limits. 
This evidence of past misjudgments on one most likely trend by whole groups of experts seems 
to suggest that experts should also be asked about the range of uncertainty they perceive in 
addition to the most likely value. It can be assumed that the expert views on future oil prices 
would not have given such a bad picture of reality if experts had been asked to also give their 
high and low extremes. At least one could think that the extremes would have reacted more 
quickly than the most likely price to the observed decline. This example strongly supported our 
view that it was very important to ask not only for the most likely path, but also for less likely 
and more extreme ones. This, however, leads us to the third reason not to have a larger scale 
Delphi study in written form. 
Crude Oil Prices 
Actual and Successive IEW Polls 
Year 
Actual 
12/81 
7/83 
1/85 
1/86 
R-92 
R-93 
R-94 
Figure 1. Oil price projections produced by the International Energy Workshop. Source: Manne 
and Schrattenholzer 1995, p. A-2. 
(3) T o  most population experts, the thought of having to specify alternative scenario 
assumptions is still very unusual, if not uncomfortable. Only a very small fraction of international 
experts in population analysis has in the past been involved in defining assumptions for 
projections. Many colleagues, when asked informally on a trial basis, have refused to come up 
with any specific numeric value. And many of those who are willing to come up with some kind 
of a guess about the future tend to think in terms of one most likely future path. The concept 
of alternative low and high values for each of the three components (roughly covering 80% of 
all possible cases) in addition to a most likely value still needs more introduction and explanation 
than can be given in a short cover letter. Although this is a mostly psychological factor, it is very 
relevant for the success of any Delphi. Stoto (1988), commenting on the same phenomenon, 
points out that we a re  asking experts for accuracy in communication (what is meant e.g. by 
''somewhat lower") and not in estimation. In a sample of students, Behn and Vaupel (1982), for 
instance, found that the phrase "It is probable that ..." was given numerical interpretation ranging 
from 20% to 98%. Hence, we should ask the experts simply to spell out more clearly what is on 
their minds. 
For the above-given reasons, a workshop of experts with the possibility of interaction was thought 
to be the most appropriate setting for a group effort to define the scenarios. Although there 
would be only one expert with specific knowledge, e.g. on African mortality conditions, other 
experts in the group could challenge his views and ask for further clarification. The expectation 
was that through the process of discussion, the subjective views of the expert would become 
modified and corrected in an inter-subjective manner that would make it a consensus view (at 
least about alternative possibilities). 
During the first two days of the workshop, a most interesting and stimulating substantive 
discussion on trends in fertility, mortality, and migration identified a large array of relevant 
factors impacting on future trends. But on the third day, when it was hoped that the individual 
experts would come up with specific numbers for high, central, and low values for TFR, life 
expectancy, and net migration in 2030 in 12 world regions--with the range between the high and 
the low values covering roughly 80%-90% of all cases--the group thought .that filling out 
individual forms with blank matrices was not a good idea. Instead, it was felt that a group 
discussion of the values was a more fruitful strategy, because it could combine individual special 
expertise with the considerations of others. 
In order to reduce the number of necessary choices on parameter values, a number of structural 
simplifications was introduced: 
(1) Changes over time will only be assumed for the total level (e.g. the TFR), while the shape 
of the age pattern is assumed to remain unchanged. In mortality, one would pick the life 
expectancy and then use extended model life tables. 
(2) In general, a linear trend between the starting year (1990) and the value chosen for 2030 
was assumed. For fertility, the TFR for 2030 was fixed and the intermediate values derived by 
linear interpolation. For mortality, a constant number of years in life expectancy improvement 
over a decade was to be chosen, and for migration, the assumed total of net migration would be 
reached within ten years and kept constant thereafter. 
(3) The underlying probability distribution was assumed to be symmetrical, i.e. if only two of 
the high, central, and low values were chosen freely, the third was already determined. Although 
this is a rather strong assumption, it turned out to be a significant help in reducing the number 
of difficult choices to be made. 
Due to these simplifications the quantitative values to be chosen boiled down to 24 numbers for 
fertility and mortality. Because of the assumption of symmetry, any two of the three values (high, 
central, low) determined the third for each of the 12 world regions. Table 1 presents the final 
choices made for fertility, and Table 2 those for mortality. For migration, assumptions were 
somewhat more complex, because a full matrix of interregional migration had to be assumed. But 
only one such matrix had to be chosen, because the additional simplifying assumption was made 
that in the low case, every region has zero net migration. 
Table 1. Fertility assumptions. Source: Lutz et al. 1994, p. 393. 
2030 
1990 Low Central High 
North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Central America & Caribbean 
South America 
West & Central Asia 
South Asia 
ChinaIHong KongITaiwan 
Southeast Asia 
North America 
JapanIAustralia 
Eastern Europe 
Western Europe 
Table 2. Mortality assumptions. Source: Lutz et al. 1994, p. 397. 
Assumed change in years of life 
Life ex~ectancv 1990 exvectancv ver decade 
Region Male Female Low Central High 
Deve fopirtg regioris 
North Africa 58.6 61.1 0.50 2.25 4.00 
Sub-Saharan Africa 49.0 52.4 -3.00 0.00 3.00 
Central America & Caribbean 65.7 71.3 1.00 2.00 3.00 
South America 64.0 69.6 1.00 2.00 3.00 
Western & Central Asia 64.4 69.3 0.50 2.25 4.00 
South Asia 58.1 58.4 0.00 2.00 4.00 
China 68.6 71.8 1.00 2.00 3.00 
Southeast Asia 61.2 65.3 0.00 2.00 4.00 
Irid~istriafized regiorts 
North America 72.2 79.0 1 .OO 2.00 3.00 
Japan/Australia/New Zealand 75.3 81.1 1 .OO 2.00 3.00 
Eastern Europe 65.9 74.7 0.50 2.25 4.00 
Western Europe 73.0 79.4 1 .OO 2.00 3.00 
As to the process of choosing these values, the group discussion resulted in important 
information, but was not conclusive. It either took the form of an auction of fertility levels ("I 
give a TFR in Southern Asia of 3.0, does anybody bid higher?") with a certain degree of 
randomness and inconsistency of logic across regions, or led to very inspiring, yet non-numerical, 
discussions about underlying forces. When it became clear that this "anti-authoritarian" discussion 
process did not generate the necessary matrix of parameters, it was finally decided to retreat to 
a less ambitious and more pragmatic solution: Following the meeting, the group of IIASA 
authors would fill in the matrix based on their best knowledge and informed by the discussion 
at the meeting, send it out to all participants, and ask for suggestions to improve it. This was how 
it finally happened. For the three IIASA scientists involved, it was easier to play the "auction 
game" internally and produce the matrix. Only minor modifications were made later on, based 
on comments by the workshop participants and other experts with whom the set of assumptions 
were discussed. 
By this more pragmatic strategy, which originally was not considered to be the most desirable 
under objectivity criteria, a full set of assumptions could be defined that has a consistent logic 
and still reflects the broad knowledge base of a group of experts. It also has been challenged in 
critical discussions, and adjustments have been made based on convincing arguments. This broad 
scientific discussion process made the authors confident that the alternative scenarios defined 
adequately reflect the present state of knowledge about the future, including its degree of 
uncertainty. For this reason, "What can we assume today?" also became the subtitle of the book. 
One important lesson learned from this exercise of trying to define the assumption for 
projections by an expert group was that ultimately the responsibility for the full set of 
assumptions needs to rest with the authors of the projection. It can be shared to some degree 
with a broader group of experts, but a fully collective responsibility is impractical, if not 
impossible. 
4. What Do the Users Expect in Terms of Information That Goes Beyond One 
Most Likely Variant (or Scenario)? 
In the publication of IIASA's world population scenarios, it was chosen to present nine 
alternative scenarios for each of the 12 regions until 2030: the Central scenario, combining the 
central assumptions of fertility, mortality and migration, plus the eight possible combinations of 
high and low values of the three components. On a global level, migration becomes irrelevant, 
and four combinations of fertility and mortality are presented in addition to the Central scenario. 
For the long range (up to 2100), five main scenarios and an odd number of special scenarios are 
presented. This fairly large number of alternative scenarios is appropriate for a scientific 
audience that can follow the underlying reasoning and appreciates the consideration of 
uncertainty, but it may be too much for non-scientific users. The problem with this question is 
that nobody ever systematically studied what the non-scientific users of projections expect to see 
in terms of uncertainty variants, and with what complexity they can deal. 
The following discussion of how many and what kind of uncertainty variants (or alternative 
scenarios) should be present to the users will mostly make reference to the United Nations 
Population Projections, which are the most prominent international projections. They are mostly 
intended for non-scientific use, but are also most frequently used by scientists. More specifically, 
the following considerations are based on discussions among demographer colleagues and 
government representatives at the recent (February/March 1995) meeting of the UN 
Commission on Population and Development (CPD) in New York, which defines the activities 
of the UN Population Division, including its population projections. 
A first step in approaching the question of what the users expect was a small informal survey 
among delegates in New York (scientists as well as diplomats). One common opinion became 
apparent right at the beginning: There was no interest in fully probabilistic population 
projections. Quite aside from methodological uncertainties on how to go about and the question 
of how to disseminate it, there was the strong feeling that almost nobody would know how to use 
them. Even for the few people who could see some positive aspects, it was unclear in what way 
government planning could benefit in practical terms from a fully probabilistic projection. 
The second question was about the usefulness of a larger number of alternative scenarios. Here 
the response was more positive, but only in terms of a useful academic exercise for a smaller 
group of interested people. There was a near consensus that the officially-published and widely- 
circulated UN projections for all countries in the world should mainly focus on one main variant 
with a maximum of two additional variants shown. 
Accepting, for the time given, this view of a maximum of three alternative paths, the question 
still arises how these two additional projections should look. There is little doubt that one main 
projection, which is considered most likely, is being demanded by the users and serves a very 
useful purpose. So far, the additionally published "high" and "low" variants of the UN population 
projections have been defined in terms of higher and lower fertility rates resulting in higher and 
lower total population sizes. For mortality, all three variants assume an identical path, and 
international migration is assumed to be virtually non-existent. It is not clear for what these 
additional two variants stand. They are not meant to represent confidence intervals, although a 
large number of non-demographic users do interpret them in this way. They also do not directly 
relate to any alternative policies that would result in the high or low paths given, nor do they 
want to indicate the maximum or minimum growth possible. 
The high and low variants of the UN projections are now defined to simply demonstrate the 
consequences of two alternative paths of future fertility trends without attaching any probability 
to them. The design of the alternative projections, which only varies fertility assumptions and 
uses identical mortality and migration assumptions, reflects a situation where the primary 
concern is with the impact of alternative fertility trends, while future mortality and migration are 
considered less problematic and of minor importance. In a way they are educational model 
calculations demonstrating what happens to population dynamics under two examples of higher 
and lower than medium fertility. 
Has the demographic situation--or our perception of it--changed sufficiently in recent years to 
suggest a change in this established UN projection practice? The only reasonable alternative 
within the constraint of only two additional projections would be to combine a low fertility with 
a low mortality assumption on the one hand, and a high fertility with a high mortality assumption 
on the other. And these variants would further gain validity if even a very rough probability 
range would be attached to the assumptions. If, for instance, the range between the high and low 
fertility assumptions would be taken to cover anything between 60% and 90%, then they would 
represent more than just more or less arbitrary sample paths. 
On the question of whether to continue with the current practice of variants in the UN 
projections, or to give alternatives for both fertility and mortality, there are political and 
scientific arguments. Below is a list of reasons supporting such a change in practice, followed by 
some arguments in favor of continuity. 
(1) The most important political reason for a change would be consistency with the Cairo 
Programme of Action. A major achievement of the Cairo document was that the issues of family 
planning and fertility-the almost exclusive focus of earlier conferences such as 1974 in 
Bucharest--were embedded in the broader issues of reproductive health and female status. The 
Cairo Programme of Action contains at least as many health-relevant components as fertility- 
relevant components. And all UNFPA documents tend to mention health in the first instance, 
followed by female empowerment and family planning at the end. And if this is not merely 
lipservice, a successful implementation of the Programme of Action would not only result in 
lower fertility, but also in lower mortality. For this reason, a reference to the low variant of the 
U N  projections (which assumes the same mortality as the medium and high variants) contained 
in a draft version of the preamble had to be removed (see discussion in Lutz 1995). Hence it 
would only be logical to come up with a low fertilityllow mortality variant in the UN projection 
that adequately reflects the vision of Cairo and its Programme of Action. 
Figure 2, which gives the global level results of IIASA's world population scenarios, indicates that 
alternative mortality assumptions do make a big difference. Low fertility combined with low 
mortality brings the total population size in 2050 more than half way towards the central scenario 
as compared to low fertility combined with high mortality. Low mortality results in a higher total 
population size than high mortality simply because more people will stay alive. This may present 
an ethical dilemma to population control advocates, but it is a simple fact of population dynamics 
that should not be hidden by not presenting such calculations. 
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Figure 2. Alternative paths of global population growth. Source: Lutz 1994, p. 446. 
(2) A substantive reason why alternative paths of future mortality should be considered in the 
published projections is that, indeed, the future course of mortality looks more uncertain today 
than it did 20 years ago. Different sources of uncertainty have arisen in different parts of the 
world. Mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia HIV infections have added a dramatic 
amount of uncertainty because only insufficient information exists about the present HIV 
prevalence and much less about its future spread. In a large number of European and Central 
Asian countries in economic transition, recent mortality increases have added considerably to 
the uncertainty about future trends. And even in the lowest mortality countries the feeling of 
uncertainty has increased, due to the erosion of the dogma of an asymptotic approach to a fixed 
maximum life span. 
(3) In an increasing number of countries the concern is not merely with total population size 
but with the age structure and especially aging. This is not only an issue for the industrialized 
countries, but for all countries with recent fertility declines--most notably China--facing 
tremendous aging problems for which they are essentially unprepared. The  extent and pace of 
aging will depend crucially on the future course of mortality, which is a strong argument not to 
disregard mortality uncertainty. In this context, the low/low projection would give the highest 
possible degree of aging, and high/high the lowest. The current three variants obscure this issue. 
(4) Finally, a combination of high fertilitylhigh mortality and low fertility/low mortality does 
not make the problematic assumption of independence of fertility and mortality. Even if the two 
components do not directly influence each other (e.g. through child replacement or  fertility 
stress), there is a lot of evidence that in the longer run they are  determined by joint forces, e.g. 
better education, health systems, and modernization in general. 
But there are  also some arguments against the departure from the current practice: 
(1) Discontinuing a long tradition always causes confusion. The question is whether this 
confusion is harmful or  healthy in terms of making people think more about the nature of 
population projections. 
(2) In the long run, fertility is still the dominating determinant of population patterns. The new 
practice would not allow isolation of the effect of alternative fertility trends, all things being 
equal. This is primarily an educational concern rather than a planning concern. 
(3) Finally, in very low fertility countries, constantly low or  even further declining fertility is 
often not considered desirable. In those cases, the low fertility/low mortality projection would 
only be considered positive in one of its components. Furthermore, in periods of crisis such as 
presently in Eastern Europe, low fertility tends to be associated with high mortality. The question 
is whether this is only a temporary phenomenon, as has been argued in historical demography. 
In the long run "modernization" tends to move both in the same direction. But there clearly 
needs to be a lower limit to fertility. 
In the context of a methodological discussion, the above considerations were presented in order 
to demonstrate the concerns of the users and even of the institutions preparing the projections 
that may be quite different from the high-flying ideas of statisticians and technical demographers. 
There clearly is an unmet need--to use the most prominent Cairo buzz word--for a serious and 
open exchange of views between those who produce population projections and those who use 
them, and the international community of demographers and statisticians that hopefully will lead 
to population projections that are more satisfactory to all parties involved. 
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